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En “Naturalismo sin representacionalismo”, Huw Price propone una variedad de 
naturalismo –una que él denomina naturalismo del sujeto– que supuestamente 
puede evitar los problemas de la localización relacionados con entidades 
“incómodas” como son los hechos morales, los significados, las verdades 
matemáticas y otras similares. A partir de una concepción expresivista de todo el 
lenguaje, Price defiende que los problemas de la localización descansan sobre un 
error categorical: el error consiste en considerar que toda oración representa algún 
estado de hechos mundano. En nuestro trabajo, a partir de nuestra crítica al 
expresivismo de Price, cuestionaremos su respuesta a los problemas de la 
localización. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Naturalismo del sujeto, representacionalismo, expresivismo 
global, deflacionismo, verdad. 
 
ABSTRACT 
In his article “Naturalism Without Representationalism”, Price proposes a variety 
of naturalism –subject naturalism, as he calls it- that is supposedly able to avoid 
placement problems about “odd” entities such as moral facts, meanings, 
mathematical truths and the like. Assuming an expressivist conception about the 
entire language, Price argues that placement problems rest on a category mistake: 
the mistake of considering all sorts of sentences as representing worldly states of 
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affairs. In this article, by arguing against Price’s expressivism, I call his response to 
placement problems into question. My thesis is that placement problems are 
genuine ontological problems. 
 
KEY WORDS: Subject Naturalism, Representationalism, Global Expressivism; 
Deflationalism; Truth.   
 
1. In “Naturalism Without Representationalism”, Price characterizes 
philosophical naturalism as “the view that natural science constrains philosophy” 
in the sense that “science takes the lead where the two overlap” (2011a, p. 184). 
Although the term “philosophical naturalism” has many senses in the literature, 
Price considers this as the basic one (2011a, p. 184). That sort of naturalism, 
understood in non-representational terms, is the one Price defends against another 
form of naturalism –“popular” or “object naturalism”, as he calls it. Thus, Price 
supports a sort of naturalism without representationalism, which he calls “subject 
naturalism”. Object naturalism exists in both ontological and epistemological keys. 
As an ontological doctrine, object naturalism is the view that “all there is is the 
world studied by science” (2011a, p. 185). As an epistemological doctrine, it is the 
view according to which “all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge” (2011a, p. 
185). Object naturalism, so characterized, faces what Price calls “placement 
problems”, i.e., problems about how to place “odd” entities such as moral facts, 
mathematical truths, meanings, causation and physical modality in the natural 
world, that is, the world studied by science. In contrast to object naturalism, Price 
opts for his particular variety of naturalism, subject naturalism, which holds that 
“philosophy needs to begin with what science tells us about ourselves” (2011a, p. 
186). This variety of naturalism is in agreement with the basic sense of the term 
“naturalism”, because if the claims of philosophy conflict with science –which tells 
us that we are natural creatures- then philosophy needs to relinquish its 
aspirations. Subject naturalism combines the epistemological doctrine, according 
to which all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge, with an expressivist 
conception of language. This particular variety of naturalism is capable of avoiding 
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–Price thinks- placement problems that undermine objet naturalism in a way that I 
will briefly explain. 
Price claims that there are two possible conceptions of the origins of 
placement problems. In the first one, the problems begin with linguistic data. 
Their starting point lies in human linguistic practice: we begin by noting that we 
use the term “X” in our language. Price calls this view of the origin of the 
placement problem “the linguistic conception”. When object naturalism adopts 
this view, it strives to consider how what speakers talk about could be the kind of 
thing studied by science. In the second view on the origins of placement problems, 
these difficulties begin with the objects themselves: in the light of a commitment 
to object naturalism, we are acquainted with X, and hence come to wonder how X 
could be a natural thing, an object studied by science. Price calls this way of 
addressing placement problems “the material conception”. Now, once one 
assumes that the linguistic conception is the correct one (Price makes some 
considerations in favor of this idea), and once one assumes anti-
representationalism, one can arrive at the conclusion that there are no material 
problems at all: placement problems about meanings, values or mathematical 
truths do not arise anymore. Placement problems arise only when attention is 
shifted from the terms themselves to what they are about, that is, when one 
uncritically assumes representationalism. Once one adopts global expressivism –as 
Price suggests- one can see placement problems as resting on a category mistake: 
the mistake of considering moral, mathematical, etc. assertions as descriptive (or 
representational). If those kinds of assertions do not actually refer, the problem of 
how to integrate their referents into scientific ontology does not arise.1 Without a 
representationalist conception of language, theoretical problems remain in the 
linguistic realm; they are puzzles about the plurality of ways of talking. The 
challenge is now to explain –in naturalistic terms- how human beings come to talk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I think that expressivism is implausible for the case of sentences such as “The linguistic 
expression X (a word or sentence) means…”. Sentences of this sort do not express an evaluative 
attitude of the speaker. Notwithstanding this, I will not consider this particular point in the article. 
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in these different ways, and what role these different language games play in their 
lives.2  
Although subject naturalism may indeed motivate some interesting 
questions,3 I will focus my attention on the key theoretical assumption of Price’s 
argumentative strategy for dissolving placement problems: his global expressivist 
conception of language. In criticizing Price’s expressivism I do not purport to 
defend object naturalism, but, instead, to (re)introduce the question of placement 
problems into the debate between naturalists and non-naturalists. This 
reintroduction could result –and this is what I would like to say- even if the 
resulting position consists in claiming that –as anti-reductionists argue- it is not 
possible to reduce the entities in question to a privileged ontology.4 
2. Expressivism is often characterized as a meta-ethical theory according to 
which sentences that employ moral terms are not descriptive or fact-stating. Moral 
terms such as “good”, “just” or “brave” do not refer to real properties in the 
world, and, for this reason, sentences that contain moral terms have no truth 
conditions, and do not represent moral facts. The main function of moral 
sentences, according to expressivists, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather 
to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. This is why 
expressivism is sometimes considered to be a variety of “non-factualism” or “non-
cognitivism”.  
Price describes non-cognitivism as making two claims about its target 
discourse, a negative and a positive one. The negative claim asserts that “these 
terms or statements lack some semantically characterized features: they are non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Price thinks that subject naturalism is prior to object naturalism because the latter rests on an 
assumption about language –representationalism- that the former questions. According to Price, 
there are good reasons to think that representationalism will not be found true from the point of 
view of object naturalism itself. But will science find that global expressivism is true? 
3 For example, why does Price assume that language, in all its dimensions, can be investigated by 
science? How could scientific and moral vocabularies be articulated in a unified image of the 
world?  
4 Expressivism faces several objections: the Frege-Geach problem, for instance, or the deflationist 
objection. Price tries to respond to some of them (see “Semantic Minimalism and Frege Point” and 
“Immodesty Without Mirrors: Making Sense on Wittgenstein’s Linguistic Pluralism”).  
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referential, non-truth-apt, non-descriptive, non-factual or something of the kind” 
(2011f, p. 260-261). The positive claim offers “an alternative account of the 
functions of the language in question –for example, that it expresses, or projects 
from, evaluative attitudes” (p. 261).5 The first claim expresses an anti-
representationalist point of view about the target discourse; the second one is the 
typical expressivist thesis about the true function of that sort of discourse. 
Then traditional expressivism, so characterized, is local because it is 
posited for a specific region of discourse (moral discourse, for example). In this 
sense, local expressivism retains the idea that at least some domains of our 
language are representational in character. Price’s expressivism, in contrast, is 
global because, according to him, there is no need to maintain the idea that some 
parts of our language represent worldly states of affairs. According to global 
expressivism, then, we should stop speaking of representations altogether: we 
should “abandon the project of theorizing about word-world in these terms” 
(2011b, p. 10). There are two main ingredients in Price’s global expressivism, the 
anti-representationalist view about the whole language, and the thesis of functional 
pluralism of language. In line with the former, the function of language is not to 
describe or represent reality. And in line with the latter, language has many 
functions, even when we consider assertions alone6. Price thinks that global 
expressivism is perfectly compatible with a certain kind of naturalism –subject 
naturalism- and with deflationism or minimalism about semantic notions.  
Now, representationalism is a conception of language and knowledge that 
can be understood in, at least, two different ways. In its strongest version, 
Representationalism (with a capital “R”) has been the target of many philosophers 
of different provenance, non-factualists as well as factualists.7 The variety of 
Representationalism that is the target of those philosophers is the one committed 
with the idea that the world is something different from the world as it figures in 
our (actual or possible) worldviews.8 Thus, in order to know whether or not our 
sentences or beliefs actually represent the world, we are obliged to try “to climb 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See also p. 240 
6 See p. 201-202. 
7 See Rorty (1991), Putnam (1981), Davidson (1984), McDowell (1998). 
8 The world so conceived is “the world well lost”, as Rorty calls it. See (1982). 
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outside our own minds” (1986, p. 9), in Nagel’s expression, to step outside our 
language so as to find out the corresponding entities which presumably make our 
sentences or beliefs true. However, as some philosophers have pointed out, this is 
absurd.9 We cannot leave aside our language (or our conceptual capacities 
associated with it) to see whether sentences and beliefs actually correspond to the 
world or not because, in order to understand the relevant states of affairs, we need 
language itself. Hence, it is useless to try to explain the representational character 
of language by appealing to the relations between our sentences and the world 
thus understood.  
However, rejecting Representationalism does not necessarily entail 
accepting global expressivism. Price characterizes representationalism as “the 
assumption that the linguistic items in question ‘stand for’ or ‘represent’ something 
non-linguistic” (2011a, p. 189). Properly understood, this weak characterization 
allows for what may be called “representationalism” (without a capital “R”), that 
is, a milder variety of representationalism. As Price himself notes, the assumption 
seems trivial. In effect, is it not a truism that “X” (a linguistic expression) refers to 
X (an object)? I think it actually is. Understood in this sense, representationalism 
(without a capital “R”) is not a semantic theory, but just common sense. 
According to this common-sense view, linguistic expressions stand for or 
represent objects and states of affairs such as they appear in our worldview.10 This allows 
us to properly grasp what is implied in the comprehension of everyday sentences 
such as, “John is in the kitchen” or “There is a bottle of milk in the fridge”. In 
these cases, we are obviously talking about certain objects (John and a bottle of 
milk, respectively); and we know that these sentences are true if and only if John is 
actually in the kitchen and if there is actually a bottle of milk in the fridge at the 
moment in which the sentences are asserted.  
Yet there are two important explanatory reasons for retaining 
representationalism. Firstly, representationalism, as I have characterized it, allows 
us to understand how linguistic expressions relate to action. If you understand that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Davidson (2001, p. 144), Rorty (1991, p. 6). 
10 I believe that this variety of representationalism can be found in McDowell (1994), (2000), 
Putnam (1999) and others. 
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the sentence “There is a bottle of milk in the fridge” stands for a certain state of 
affairs; and if you are looking for a bottle of milk, you know where to get it. The 
sentence can guide your actions because it represents the location of the bottle.11 It 
is hard to see both how this sense of the term “representation” could be 
objectionable and how one could explain the guiding role of beliefs without 
appealing to it. In particular, it is hard to fathom, at least prima facie, how the 
internal notion of representation developed by Price could explain how beliefs 
may guide actions. In effect, Price distinguishes between two different notions of 
representation: one external and another internal. In line with the first one, 
representations are mental tokens that co-vary with some external factor or 
environmental condition. In the second one, the internal notion of representation, 
is characterized as a token which counts as a representation, not in virtue of some 
external factor, but rather “in virtue of its position, or role, in some sort of 
cognitive or inferential architecture –in virtue of its links, within a network, to 
other items of the same general kinds” (2011b, p. 20). Whereas Price clearly 
dismisses the first notion of representation, he accepts the second one. It may now 
be conceded, of course, that representations have inferential relations with other 
representations; however, since Price does not ascribe them the capacity of 
representing external factors or environmental conditions, it is hard to see how 
they could guide action. If we assume that our representations do not match 
anything in the world, if “the entire image is free-standing” (2011b, p. 38), what 
reason could we have for acting in light of what they tell us? If the sentence 
“There is a bottle of milk in the fridge” is only a node within a network composed 
by other nodes, without any reference to something external to it, why would we 
have to take it as a reason for looking for the bottle in the fridge?12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Anti-representationalists such as Rorty and James have claimed that beliefs and sentences are 
instruments for coping with reality, but it is mysterious how that would be possible without 
appealing to the representational character of sentences and beliefs.  
12 Likewise, it could be plausibly argued that other sorts of sentences –moral sentences, for 
instance- are able to guide action in virtue of their representational function. For example, given 
the relevant purposes, the sentence “John is honest” may guide your action in virtue of the 
property which is ascribed to John. 
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Secondly, common-sense representationalism allows us to understand how 
assertions and perceptions can be related to each other. In effect, if you have 
doubts about whether the sentence “There is a bottle of milk in the fridge” is true, 
you can verify it by opening the fridge and seeing whether there is a bottle of milk 
in it or not.13 In doing so, you intuitively confront the sentence in question with a 
certain state of affairs such as you perceive it. The state of affairs that the sentence 
“There is a bottle of milk in the fridge” stands for, when asserted, is the same state 
of affairs you can perceive. You can perceive it as such if you have (among other 
conditions) the same concepts that are involved in the corresponding sentence.14 
In order for this to be the case, you need not to climb outside your own mind. The 
objects for which the words stand are the very objects and states of affairs you can 
perceive, namely, objects that constitute a part of our everyday ontology, appearing 
as such in our language games.15 My argument is, then, as follows. Perception 
discloses the world to us; it reveals to us how objects are arranged in states of 
affairs. By doing so, it can help us to determine whether sentences that refer to 
those states of affairs are true or not. This epistemic role of perception is possible 
only because we understand that sentences stand for the states of affairs we can 
perceive.  
Just like Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, Price may respond to this line of 
thought by arguing that perception does not disclose the world to us at all.16 He 
could claim perception is merely a causal intermediary between our minds and 
reality. From that point of view, perceptual experiences would not be mental 
episodes with any content, but the cause of our observational judgments and 
beliefs. With Davidson, he could claim that to perceive that p is, under appropriate 
circumstances, to be caused (in the right way) by one’s senses to believe that p.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Action can also help to verify sentences. The fact that one can do something can be a sign that 
the world is arranged thus and so. 
14 This epistemic connection between assertions and perception plausibly explains how it is 
possible for empirical assertions to have empirical content. See McDowell (1994). 
15 Likewise, it may be argued that a moral sentence such as “John is kind” can be verified by 
looking at how John behaves. 
16 See, for example, Rorty (1998); Davidson (2001); Brandom (2002). 
17 I am paraphrasing what Davidson claims in (2001, p. xvi). 
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Thus, Price could reject the idea according to which perception helps us, by means 
of a confrontation between sentences and the world such as it is perceived, to 
determine the truth-value of observational sentences, and then, he could deny that 
there is any reason to think that sentences stand for anything in the world.  
However, the idea that perceptual experience is merely a causal 
intermediary between perceptual beliefs and the world is implausible for several 
reasons. To begin with, to perceive that p cannot merely mean to be caused by 
one’s senses to believe that p because the phenomenology of perceptual 
experiences is different from the one of perceptual beliefs. In effect, while in 
perception the world appears to us under one or another modality (vision, touch, 
etc.), perceptual beliefs a-modally represent states of affairs. Secondly, some cases 
have been mentioned in favor of the independence of perceptual experience with 
respect to belief. In effect, there are situations in which we know that things are 
not as they look. For example, according to my visual experience, it seems to me 
that the two lines of the Müller-Lyer illusion differ in length even though I know 
that they are of the same length. In cases like this one, one is not obliged to believe 
that things are as they appear in perceptual experience.18 So if perceptual 
experience can contradict what one believes (the lines look different in length 
while one is having a visual experience of them, yet one does not believe that they 
differ in length), then it cannot be true that experience is only a causal link 
between beliefs and the world, as Davidson and his followers claim. If perceptual 
experiences can contradict beliefs, they must be mental states with their own 
content. Thirdly, it could be argued that, if perception did not put us in cognitive 
contact with the world, if perception were a mere causal linkage between our 
minds and states of affairs, we would not have any reason to think our judgments 
and beliefs are about the world at all. For if a confrontation between perceptual 
beliefs and the world such as it could be perceived is impossible (because 
perceptual experiences do not disclose the world to us), if perceptual experiences 
only causally (but not epistemically) mediated between beliefs and the world, how 
could we know what the cause of perceptual beliefs are? Without the epistemic 
role of perceptual experiences the world would become the incognizable source of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Evans (1982, p. 123). 
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our sensory affections. This would reintroduce a notion of world that Rorty –
another anti-representationalist- rightly considers well lost.19 
Finally, the suggested idea of a confrontation between sentences and the 
corresponding states of affairs such as they are perceived becomes even more 
compelling when we consider sentences with demonstrative expressions. Let’s 
consider, for example, the sentence “This bottle is empty”, asserted in front of a 
certain bottle, accompanied with an indicative gesture in direction of the relevant 
bottle. In this sort of cases, there is no question the demonstrative expression 
“This bottle” stands for this bottle. If you do not grasp that relation, you simply 
cannot understand what the speaker means. In cases like this, to know what the 
speaker talks about, to know what in the world her assertion refers to, is to 
understand what she says. Thus, in the case of the understanding of assertions 
with demonstrative expressions, the relation of “standing for” between words and 
objects seems to be indispensable.   
To sum up what I have said so far, the importance of holding on to the 
idea that language is representationally related to the world lies in the fact that it 
allows us to explain three related problems: the relation between sentences and 
actions when the former guide, in part, the latter; the epistemic relation between 
observational sentences and relevant perceptions; and how we can understand 
sentences which involve demonstrative expressions. In these cases, it is crucial for 
the objects or states of affairs that sentences stand for to be the same as the 
objects or states of affairs being perceived or looked for. Given a sentence about 
your immediate surroundings and an adequate wish, you would know (if you take 
the sentence to be true) where to look because you would understand that the 
sentence stands for a certain state of affairs in the world. Similarly, you would 
know that perceiving a state of affairs in the world can allow verification of the 
sentence that refers to it because you would understand that the sentence, if it is 
true, stands for that state of affairs. When sentences contain demonstrative 
expressions, perception is necessary not only for their verification, but also for 
understanding them. Understanding demonstrative expressions presupposes the 
idea that they stand for their referents. Of course, nothing that I have said in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I develop these arguments in Kalpokas (2012), and (2014). 
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section cancels out our acknowledgment that some sorts of sentences do not 
represent worldly states of affairs. My point merely is that some kinds of sentences 
(for instance, empirical and perhaps moral sentences) do represent states of affairs 
in the world. 
3. The notion of representation, as I have used it here, is neither the 
external notion that is used by the Representationalist, nor the internal one that 
Price accepts.20 In my view, some parts of language actually represent objects and 
states of affairs in the world, sentences actually have truth-conditions and many 
terms refer to things in the world. But the world which is referred to and described 
by our expressions is the world such as it appears in our language-games, not a 
world that is epistemically beyond our linguistic and cognitive practices. This 
notion of “world” does not undermine, however, the ontological independence of 
reality. The physical world is what it is independently of language and of our 
mental states. Acknowledging this point is perfectly consistent with affirming that 
independent reality is inextricably connected with our actions, perceptions and 
linguistic practices.  
Accordingly, I think that the notion of representation I am recommending 
could be used for solving some problems in Price’s functional explanation of the 
notion of truth. In effect, in “Truth as Convenient Friction”, Price defends, 
against Rorty, the thesis according to which the norm of truth is an additional 
norm to that of justification. Following the norm of truth, if Not-P, then it is 
incorrect to assert that P, even if one has justification for asserting P. This norm 
does not involve, Price thinks, a substantial notion of truth. His idea is just that 
whenever one is prepared to assert that P, one should also be to be prepared to 
ascribe fault to anyone who asserts Not-P. As Price says, “what matters is that 
disagreement itself be treated as grounds for disapproval” (2011d, p. 173). Two 
arguments support that thesis. Firstly, without a norm stronger than that of 
justification (for me or for us), the idea of improving my or our current 
commitments would be incoherent. The norm of truth creates the conceptual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Price (2011b, p. 32). 
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space for the idea of further improvement.21 Secondly, the norm of truth 
encourages such improvement by motivating speakers who disagree to try to 
resolve their disagreements. Without that norm, differences of opinion would be 
taken as differences of preference, not as a sign of the fact that the assertion of 
one of the speakers is objectively incorrect. The mark of the acknowledgment of 
the norm of truth is “the disposition to disapprove of speakers with whom we 
disagree” (2011d, p. 175). According to Price’s pragmatist approach, then, the 
essential difference that the norm of truth introduces in our linguistic practices is 
that it makes our linguistic practice genuinely assertoric (2011d, p. 177).22 
I agree with Price that there is a distinctive norm of truth which is different 
from other norms, such as that of warranted assertibility or sincerity, making 
disagreement matter. I also think, as he does, that the norm of truth provides an 
incentive to resolve disagreements. However, the crucial question is: why is this 
so? Why do some disagreements between assertions matter? Why do we feel that 
some particular disagreements must be resolved? Why do we think that some 
disagreements are signs of objective errors? For example, whereas disagreement 
over sentences such as “I like chocolate” does not normally matter, disagreement 
over sentences such as “The murder was committed by the butler” does usually 
matter. Why so? I believe there is an explanatory gap in Price’s pragmatic approach 
to the norm of truth. The difference established by acknowledging the norm of 
truth in our linguistic practices is not completely explained by appealing only to 
the pragmatic level of language. 
At this point, it is important to realize that global expressivism makes it 
difficult to see how the explanation required could be provided. Indeed, according 
to Price, terms such as “true” and “false” give voice to “a fundamental practice of 
expressions of attitudes of approval and disapproval, in response to perceptions of 
agreement and disagreement between expressed commitments” (2011d, p. 174). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This argument can also be found in Habermas (2000). 
22 Price’s argument could be reconstructed as a transcendental argument according to which the 
acknowledgement of the norm of truth is a necessary or constitutive requirement of our practice of 
assertion.  
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But if “true” and “false” merely express attitudes of approval and disapproval, why 
should we suppose that disagreements matter? Supposing I claimed sentence “P” 
is true, and you claimed that “P” is false. If “true” and “false” only expressed our 
attitudes of approval and disapproval of “P” respectively, why should we think 
that the other is objectively wrong about “P”? In other words, if “true” and “false” 
did not denote properties that we are ascribing to “P”, it could be just said that I 
approve “P” and you do not. Then, it would not be clear why we should not be 
more tolerant with this kind of disagreement. 
I think what we need here is a complementary account to the pragmatic 
one offered by Price. My suggestion is that disagreements matter because, when 
we claim that “P” is true, we ascribe a property to “P” (correspondence with the 
world, for instance). When the relevant disagreements arise, we discuss about 
whether that attribution is correct or not. And correctness of the attribution 
matters because, if it is correct, it means that the world is as “P” says it is. In 
effect, when someone asserts that the murder was committed by the butler and 
someone else denies this, given an interest for resolving a crime, the disagreement 
matters because either the murder was committed by the butler or not. When 
someone claims that the sentence “The murder was committed by the butler” is 
true, and when the sentence is actually true, there really is a state of affairs in the 
world in virtue of which the sentence is true. Disagreement about the truth-value 
of the sentence matters because, if the sentence is true, the butler committed the 
murder. Since reality is the same for everyone, so is truth. Thus, Price’s pragmatic 
explanation of the norm of truth should be complemented with an account that, 
ultimately, connects our assertions with the world, with the state of affairs they 
describe. In other words, the pragmatic explanation should be articulated with a 
semantic one. The appeal to the semantic level explains why some sorts of 
disagreement give rise to discussion and research: because reality cannot be as “P” 
and “Not-P” claim it is at the same time. 
4. I have argued so far that there is a variety of representationalism that is 
not only free from the usual problems of traditional Representationalism, but that 
is also necessary to explain the relation between language, on the one hand, and 
action and perception, on the other hand. Thus, rejecting Representationalism 
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does not necessarily entail accepting expressivism. But there is another approach 
involved in Price’s naturalism: deflationism. In contrast with some critics of 
expressivism, Price claims that deflationism about semantic notions such as 
“truth”, “reference” and “truth-condition” is perfectly consistent with 
expressivism. He also claims that deflationism is a complement of his subject 
naturalism. In effect, the subject naturalist’s basic task is –the way Price defines it- 
to account for the use of linguistic terms in the lives of natural creatures in a 
natural environment. The important point here is that, according to Price, “the 
subject naturalist might simply find no need for an explanatory category of 
semantic properties and relations” (2011a, p. 194). In other words, the subject 
naturalist can be a deflationist about semantic terms. But why should we accept 
deflationism? Leaving aside the remarks I have already made in sections 2 and 3, 
which have attempted to motivate the need for the semantic notions that the 
deflationist rejects, there is a powerful argument in the literature, proposed by 
Boghossian (1990), which questions the consistency of deflationism. The argument 
proceeds as follows. 
A deflationary conception of truth is the view that there really is no such 
thing as the property of truth that sentences or thoughts may enjoy and that would 
be named by the words “true” or “truth”. It is typically expressed like this: 
 
(D) The predicate “true” does not refer to a property. 
   
The problem with this view is that –as Boghossian argues- “the denial that 
a given predicate refers to, or expresses, a property, only makes sense on a robust 
construal of predicate reference; yet on a deflationary construal, there is, simply, no 
space for denying, of a significant, predicative expression, that it expresses a 
property” (1990, p. 181). Thus, the denial that the truth predicate refers to a 
property must itself be understood in terms of a robust notion of reference. 
Otherwise, the claim that the predicate “true” fails to refer to a property would be 
false. So the denial that truth is robust attempted in (D) can succeed only if it fails.     
Price concedes that, under Boghossian’s construal, deflationism is 
inconsistent. However, he thinks that the deflationist could escape from the 
objection if she rejects the representational view of language: “So long as a 
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semantic deflationist simply rejects this theoretical framework, her position is not 
incoherent” (2011a, p. 191). Thus, according to Price, “A deflationist can 
consistently offer a use-explanatory account of semantic terms, while saying 
nothing of theoretical weight about whether these terms ‘refer’, or ‘have truth-
conditions’” (2011a, p. 191). The key of Price’s response to Boghossian’s challenge 
to deflationism is the distinction between “denying in one’s theoretical voice that these 
terms refer or have truth-conditions (which Boghossian is right to point out that a 
deflationist cannot do); and being silent in one’s theoretical voice about whether these 
terms refer or have truth-conditions. A deflationist can, and indeed must, do the 
latter, having couched her theoretical claims about the terms involved in other 
terms entirely –and having insisted, qua deflationist, that the semantic notions do 
no interesting causal-explanatory work” (2011a, p. 191-192).23 Thus, according to 
Price, the claim of subject naturalism is merely that “it will find no reason to say 
that there are [semantic properties]” (2011a, p. 193).  
However, Price’s response is not convincing, for, to begin with, if 
Boghossian’s argument is correct, deflationism cannot consistently be formulated. 
If (D) expresses the thesis that defines deflationism, and if (D) cannot consistently 
be asserted, deflationism cannot be a theoretical option. Moreover, the strategy of 
“being silent” does not allow the deflationist to escape from the objection made by 
Boghossian, because even if the deflationist were silent about whether semantic 
terms refer or have truth-conditions, she would be in fact explaining those terms as 
if they did not refer or have truth-conditions. In other words, not only does the 
deflationist assume a theoretical view that cannot be consistently formulated, but 
she also takes for granted, in her explanatory practice itself, that deflationism is true, 
because she thinks that she can explain semantic terms without having to say that 
they refer or have truth-conditions. Thus, if she remains theoretically silent about 
whether semantic terms refer or have truth-conditions, she will not be able to 
remain practically silent about that, because, after all, she tries to explain semantic 
terms in a deflationary way. However, there cannot be any satisfactory deflationary 
explanation of semantic terms. In other words, representationalism, characterized 
in its minimal sense (as the mere thesis according to which words stand for non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Price repeats this answer in p. 258. 
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linguistic things) is mandatory, because we already have reason to say that there are 
semantic properties.24 
Price uses an analogy in order to illustrate his point. Unlike Creationists, 
Darwinians do not think that species were created by God. But rejecting the view 
that God created the species does not require accepting –Price argues- the claim 
that God did not create the species. The idea is simply avoiding theological 
vocabulary in science.25 Similarly, “rejecting the view that ascriptions of semantic 
predicates are referential –rejecting it as a theoretical view- does not require -Price 
claims- that we endorse a negative claim, in which the semantic terms are employed 
in our theoretical voice” (2011f, p. 258). However, the analogy does not help here, 
because the question at stake between deflationists and non-deflationists is 
different from the debate between Creationists and Darwinians. In effect, to claim 
that God did not create the species is not inconsistent in itself, whereas to claim 
that the predicate “true” does not refer to a property actually is. Thus, as I have 
claimed, we cannot avoid certain semantic presuppositions -as Price would want- 
because they are engaged in our explanatory task. 
Let me illustrate my point by using an analogy. Suppose that I want to 
reject the claim that I exist without endorsing the negative claim that I do not 
exist.26 In doing so, could I really escape from the objection according to which it 
is contradictory to claim “I do not exist”? Well, in a way, I could, because I am 
making no claim. However, could I live as though the claim “I do not exist” were 
false? Obviously not, because even though I have never made that claim, 
everything that I do and think presupposes that I actually exist. Thus, it is 
completely illusory to attempt to live according to the content of the assertion “I 
do not exist”, even when I never make the assertion “I do not exist”. Hence, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Moreover, it is hard to see how the deflationist could proceed, because, given the fact that 
nowadays other rival theories exist, in a certain moment the deflationist will surely have to 
characterize her theoretical position and explain why one should adopt it. But in order to answer 
those questions, the deflationist cannot remain silent. As soon as she answers them, Boghossian’s 
argument will apply to her responses. 
25 See Price (p. 258). 
26 For the comparison between the negation of Descartes’s cogito and Boghossian’s argument 
against deflationism, see Boghossian (1990, p. 183). 
Price on Expressivism and the Placement Problem 
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, Vol. 1, nº 1, 2014. 
117 
think that the deflationist cannot explain semantic terms in her own vocabulary, as 
if she could simply avoid endorsing the negative claim that “true” does not refer to 
a property, because, if Boghossian’s argument is correct, the predicate “true” does 
refer to a property.   
5. Price thinks that placement problems can be dissolved by adopting 
global expressivism. According to him, placement problems presuppose a category 
mistake. The source of that sort of error is –he claims- the unquestioned adoption 
of representationalism. As soon as we accept global expressivism –Price argues- 
not only do placement problems disappear, but we gain a much richer view of 
language as well. However, expressivism is a questionable theoretical view. As I 
have argued in § 2, it shows some difficulty explaining how language relates to 
action and perception. Moreover, the expressivist abandonment of the idea that 
sentences stand for non-linguistic items in the world, even in the minimal sense I 
have recommended, prevents from fully explaining how the norm of truth works 
in our linguistic practices (§ 3). Finally, in § 4 I have tried to show that Price has 
not responded to Boghossian’s argument against deflationism, which is the 
complementary theoretical view of Price’s sort of expressivism. Thus, I think that 
Price’s main argument for dismissing placement problems as mere category 
mistakes has been undermined. Without expressivism, placement problems can re-
acquire their genuine character as problems. As I have tried to make clear, to reject 
expressivism entails that, in a certain sense, linguistic expressions represent non-
linguistic parts of reality. This view about language is not incompatible with the 
recognition that linguistic expressions have many functions. The general moral to 
be drawn from my reflection is this: the dispute between naturalists and anti-
naturalists takes place not only in language, but also in reality.  
Daniel Kalpokas 
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 
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